個人並不太殷賞蔡子強，但他這編文卻情理兼備，我無法不認同。
The society must be better than the individual／文﹕蔡子強
【明報專訊】正在上映的電影《選戰風雲》，片中有如此一幕，由佐治古尼（George Clooney）飾演的民主黨總統候選人莫理斯（Mike Morris），在選舉論壇被質問，反對死刑的他，如果被殺的是他的太太，看法還會否一樣？
熟悉美國政治史的朋友都知道，這是1988年總統大選，挑戰老布殊的麻省州長杜卡基斯（Michael Dukakis），在電視辯論中讓他一敗塗地的一條題目。當時主持Bernard Shaw問他﹕「州長，如果Kitty Dukakis（杜的妻子）被姦殺，你會否覺得兇手應該被判死刑呢？」結果杜卡基斯木無表情的給了以下一個答案﹕「我不會，我想你知道我畢生都反對死刑。」事後，很多觀眾都感到杜卡基斯的答案，流於麻木不仁，似乎對寢邊至愛的生死，無動於中，印象大打折扣。這晚之後，杜氏的民意支持度由原本的49%，急跌至42%，大勢頓去。
面對這個兩難問題，今次莫理斯又如何回答呢？
社會應該比個人更加冷靜理性
莫理斯說，他個人會想把這個殺人犯置諸死地，甚至不惜為此鋃鐺入獄，但在政策討論層面，他卻不會如此倡導一個公共政策的立場，因為﹕
「The society must be better than the individual」（社會應該比個人更加優秀）。
上個星期在本欄寫了一篇〈Good People, Bad People, No Other Difference〉，呼籲大家不要以「蝗蟲」這類侮辱性字眼來形容祖國同胞，讓兩地傷口進一步撕裂。那篇文章引起好些迴響，有讀者回應，說我是「針唔拮到肉唔知痛」、「唔係孕婦，唔明白孕婦搵唔到醫院位生仔幾慘」、「學者生活在象牙塔，感受唔到小市民生活有幾窘迫，前線員工有幾大壓力」……
對於這些批評，說我沒有切膚之痛，容我謙卑的受下。但我只是想帶出一點，在討論公共政策時，市民的遭遇和困難，固然應常在我心，但卻也應該超越情緒的層面，把之昇華，抽離和冷靜的去思考問題，想出解決方法，因為﹕「The society must be better than the individual」，社會應該比個人更加冷靜、更加理性、考慮問題更加周詳。
同情，就等於要不分青紅皂白？
例如，前一段時間，當內地遊客來港「掃貨」，「掃貴」奶粉，甚至讓市面缺貨時，有網民便一哄而起，提出要徵收「奶粉離境稅」，甚至連電視新聞也來湊熱鬧，煞有介事的炒作了一番，儼然成了解決問題的一大良策，不支持者便是不知民間疾苦。
父母親為孩子張羅奶粉而四出奔波，那一份焦慮和壓力，當然應該體諒，但社會整體卻不能陷入同樣情緒化當中，應該想出更周詳、妥當的解決方法（例如敦促政府檢視奶粉供應），而非單純為了同情，便附和一些太過民粹、草率的建議，連可行性也未想清楚，便急不及待表態附和，以示自已「撐」這些可憐父母。如今相隔一段時間，大家冷靜下來，平復下來，對於當日鬧得熱烘烘的「奶粉離境稅」建議，相信只會報以一笑。
再舉醫院產科牀位緊絀和雙非嬰問題為例，在連日傳媒的報道和渲染下，問題被描繪成像是因為大量雙非孕婦「衝關」，於是兵臨城下，危城告急。因此，找不到醫院牀位的本地孕婦，在心力交瘁、求助無門下，便轉而控訴「蝗禍」。
我再次重申，我同情本地孕婦的遭遇，亦同意要設法解決，但卻同時想指出一點，不錯，2010年的雙非嬰兒有3.2萬多名，佔全港出生嬰兒總數近三成七，問題看似十分嚴重，亦驟眼看似是攤薄本地醫療資源的罪魁禍首。但大家卻有否想過，這其實是政府近年口口聲聲說要「發展醫療產業」，但卻規劃失誤下出現的惡果。就是為了要賺內地同胞錢，所以要歡迎他們來港產子。以2012年為例，政府把非本地孕婦來港產子的數額定為3.5萬名，當中在私立醫院的是3.1萬名。比較起來，2011年頭11個月，公立醫院非符合資格人士經由急症室入院分娩的人數，為1453。這些資料不是什麼秘密，在食物及衛生局去年12月13日向立法會提交的文件中都可以找到。我的一名學生，中大政政系畢業現在負笈海外留學的Edwin，最近便在facebook詳列數據剖析有關問題，我希望《明報》的讀者有機會一看。
不用祭起「蝗蟲論」，也可把問題說清楚
所以要解決問題，不用祭起「蝗蟲論」這面大旗，只要把矛頭指向政府，要其為過去所謂「發展醫療產業」的規劃失誤負責，把政策重新修訂，削減非本地孕婦來港產子的配額。這都可以通過理性的政策討論，把問題說得清清楚楚，想出解決方法，而不用訴諸仇恨和歧視的語言。
我贊成一處地方的公共服務應該讓本地人優先享用。周二，公民黨的代表要求衛生署停止向雙非孕婦發出預約產前檢查，或分娩證明書，預留牀位給本地孕婦及港人內地配偶孕婦使用。同時，又促請政府聯同內地相關部門全力打擊中介公司及其活動，並嚴懲闖關者。我相信，這些都是對症下藥的良策。過程中，公民黨沒有祭起什麼「蝗蟲論」，已經把訴求說得很清楚。
至於自由行和自駕遊，我認為也可以用同樣的方式去討論。究竟香港的基建、配套等容量，能否容下如此數目龐大的遊客？沈旭暉所提的巴哈馬經驗，對香港有否參考價值？這些都是可以通過政策語言去討論的。我也不想見到在繁忙地區如旺角、銅鑼灣等，書店、本土特色店等被連鎖電器舖、名牌店、化妝品店、藥房等crowd out，弄至無處容身，讓香港日漸喪失本土特色，但這是一個旅遊業的規劃問題，自由行是否應該放緩？自駕遊是否應該叫停？這都是政策選項，毋須以「蝗蟲論」來看待問題。
不是不要同情，而是應該超越
讓我再重申，我們不需要用「蝗蟲論」這類充滿歧視和侮辱性的語言，已經可以把政府政策上的失誤及思慮不周，說得清清楚楚。矛頭應該指向特區政府，而不是讓一整個族群的人，為少數人所犯的劣行，當上出氣袋，背上十字架。
我們當然應該懷同情和仁愛之心，去看待市民在生活中遇到的困難和折騰，也應該對自身的幸運，多懷感恩，但這卻並不表示我們需要透過滿口憤慨、衝動的說話來證明自己。如果我們真的想為問題尋求出路、解決方法，就應該多從政策的語言，而非仇恨的語言，來切入問題，討論問題。
我們每個人都是有血有肉、有着七情六慾之輩，人心肉做，當遇上困厄、利益受損的一刻，也難免會怒火攻心，我自己也不例外，但當整個社會去面對有關問題時，就不能這樣，就應該超越，因為，「The society must be better than the individual」。
蔡子強
中文大學政治與行政學系高級導師
星期四, 2月 09, 2012
星期二, 2月 07, 2012
50%以上美國人認為伊朗有危險性
剛看新聞說50%以上美國人認為伊朗有危險性，美國人就是這樣，容易受政客的鼓動，說人家有危險性就去制裁人甚至動武打人。
伊朗對美國會有甚麼的危險性...只是伊朗不聽美國的話..
就算伊朗真的發展核武也不用來攻擊美國吧...那來對美國的危險..
國不夠強就會這樣，不聽美國話就要打、樣衰也要打..
最危險的國家其實就是美國。
伊朗對美國會有甚麼的危險性...只是伊朗不聽美國的話..
就算伊朗真的發展核武也不用來攻擊美國吧...那來對美國的危險..
國不夠強就會這樣，不聽美國話就要打、樣衰也要打..
最危險的國家其實就是美國。
星期四, 12月 22, 2011
Playing with fire: Obama's threat to China
就是外國媒體也有評論留意到美國在推出新冷戰，難得一些仇中香港政論家及香港人反而說是中國自己杯弓蛇影。
From Al Jazeera
Playing with fire: Obama's threat to China
Michael Klare
Obama says US influence will turn from the Middle East towards the "vast potential of the Asia-Pacific region".
When it comes to China policy, is the Obama administration leaping from the frying pan directly into the fire? In an attempt to turn the page on two disastrous wars in the greater Middle East, it may have just launched a new Cold War in Asia - once again, viewing oil as the key to global supremacy.
The new policy was signalled by President Obama himself on November 17 in an address to the Australian Parliament in which he laid out an audacious - and extremely dangerous - geopolitical vision. Instead of focusing on the greater Middle East, as has been the case for the last decade, the United States will now concentrate its power in Asia and the Pacific.
"My guidance is clear," he declared in Canberra. "As we plan and budget for the future, we will allocate the resources necessary to maintain our strong military presence in this region."
While administration officials insist that this new policy is not aimed specifically at China, the implication is clear enough: from now on, the primary focus of US military strategy will not be counterterrorism, but the containment of that economically booming land - at whatever risk or cost.
The planet's new centre of gravity
The new emphasis on Asia and the containment of China is necessary, top officials insist, because the Asia-Pacific region now constitutes the "centre of gravity" of world economic activity. While the United States was bogged down in Iraq and Afghanistan, the argument goes, China had the leeway to expand its influence in the region.
For the first time since the end of World War II, Washington is no longer the dominant economic actor there. If the United States is to retain its title as the world's paramount power, it must, this thinking goes, restore its primacy in the region and roll back Chinese influence. In the coming decades, no foreign policy task will, it is claimed, be more important than this.
In line with its new strategy, the administration has undertaken a number of moves intended to bolster US power in Asia, and so put China on the defensive. These include a decision to deploy an initial 250 US Marines - someday to be upped to 2,500 - to an Australian air base in Darwin on that country's north coast, and the adoption on November 18 of "the Manila Declaration", a pledge of closer US military ties with the Philippines.
"An economically weakened United States can no longer hope to prevail in multiple regions simultaneously."
At the same time, the White House announced the sale of 24 F-16 fighter jets to Indonesia and a visit by Hillary Clinton to isolated Burma, long a Chinese ally - the first there by a secretary of state in 56 years. Clinton has also spoken of increased diplomatic and military ties with Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam - all countries surrounding China or overlooking key trade routes that China relies on for importing raw materials and exporting manufactured goods.
As portrayed by administration officials, such moves are intended to maximise America's advantages in the diplomatic and military realm at a time when China dominates the economic realm regionally. In a recent article in Foreign Policy magazine, Clinton revealingly suggested that an economically weakened United States can no longer hope to prevail in multiple regions simultaneously. It must choose its battlefields carefully and deploy its limited assets - most of them of a military nature - to maximum advantage. Given Asia's strategic centrality to global power, this means concentrating resources there.
"Over the last ten years," she writes, "we have allocated immense resources to [Iraq and Afghanistan]. In the next ten years, we need to be smart and systematic about where we invest time and energy, so that we put ourselves in the best position to sustain our leadership [and] secure our interests ... One of the most important tasks of American statecraft over the next decade will therefore be to lock in a substantially increased investment - diplomatic, economic, strategic and otherwise - in the Asia-Pacific region."
Such thinking, with its distinctly military focus, appears dangerously provocative. The steps announced entail an increased military presence in waters bordering China and enhanced military ties with that country's neighbours - moves certain to arouse alarm in Beijing and strengthen the hand of those in the ruling circle (especially in the Chinese military leadership) who favour a more activist, militarised response to US incursions.
Whatever forms that takes, one thing is certain: the leadership of the globe's number two economic power is not going to let itself appear weak and indecisive in the face of a US buildup on the periphery of its country. This, in turn, means that we may be sowing the seeds of a new Cold War in Asia in 2011.
The US military buildup and the potential for a powerful Chinese counter-thrust have already been the subject of discussion in the American and Asian press. But one crucial dimension of this incipient struggle has received no attention at all: the degree to which Washington's sudden moves have been dictated by a fresh analysis of the global energy equation, revealing (as the Obama administration sees it) increased vulnerabilities for the Chinese side and new advantages for Washington.
The new energy equation
For decades, the United States has been heavily dependent on imported oil, much of it obtained from the Middle East and Africa, while China was largely self-sufficient in oil output. In 2001, the United States consumed 19.6 million barrels of oil per day, while producing only nine million barrels itself. The dependency on foreign suppliers for that 10.6 million-barrel shortfall proved a source of enormous concern for Washington policymakers. They responded by forging ever closer, more militarised ties with Middle Eastern oil producers and going to war on occasion to ensure the safety of US supply lines.
In 2001, China, on the other hand, consumed only five million barrels per day and so, with a domestic output of 3.3 million barrels, needed to import only 1.7 million barrels. Those cold, hard numbers made its leadership far less concerned about the reliability of the country's major overseas providers - and so it did not need to duplicate the same sort of foreign policy entanglements that Washington had long been involved in.
Now, so the Obama administration has concluded, the tables are beginning to turn. As a result of China's booming economy and the emergence of a sizeable and growing middle class (many of whom have already bought their first cars), the country's oil consumption is exploding. Running at about 7.8 million barrels per day in 2008, it will, according to recent projections by the US Department of Energy, reach 13.6 million barrels in 2020, and 16.9 million in 2035.
Domestic oil production, on the other hand, is expected to grow from 4.0 million barrels per day in 2008 to 5.3 million in 2035. Not surprisingly, then, Chinese imports are expected to skyrocket from 3.8 million barrels per day in 2008 to a projected 11.6 million in 2035 - at which time they will exceed those of the United States.
"Thanks to increased production in 'tough oil' areas of the United States ... future imports are expected to decline, even as energy consumption rises."
The US, meanwhile, can look forward to an improved energy situation. Thanks to increased production in "tough oil" areas of the United States, including the Arctic seas off Alaska, the deep waters of the Gulf of Mexico and shale formations in Montana, North Dakota and Texas, future imports are expected to decline, even as energy consumption rises.
In addition, more oil is likely to be available from the Western Hemisphere rather than the Middle East or Africa. Again, this will be thanks to the exploitation of yet more "tough oil" areas, including the Athabasca tar sands of Canada, Brazilian oil fields in the deep Atlantic and increasingly pacified energy-rich regions of previously war-torn Colombia. According to the Department of Energy, combined production in the United States, Canada and Brazil is expected to climb by 10.6 million barrels per day between 2009 and 2035 - an enormous jump, considering that most areas of the world are expecting declining output.
Whose sea lanes are these anyway?
From a geopolitical perspective, all this seems to confer a genuine advantage on the United States, even as China becomes ever more vulnerable to the vagaries of events in, or along, the sea lanes to distant lands. It means Washington will be able to contemplate a gradual loosening of its military and political ties with the Middle Eastern oil states that have dominated its foreign policy for so long and have led to those costly, devastating wars.
Indeed, as President Obama said in Canberra, the US is now in a position to begin to refocus its military capabilities elsewhere. "After a decade in which we fought two wars that cost us dearly," he declared, "the United States is turning our attention to the vast potential of the Asia-Pacific region."
For China, all this spells potential strategic impairment. Although some of China's imported oil will travel overland through pipelines from Kazakhstan and Russia, the great majority of it will still come by tanker from the Middle East, Africa and Latin America over sea lanes policed by the US Navy. Indeed, almost every tanker bringing oil to China travels across the South China Sea, a body of water the Obama administration is now seeking to place under effective naval control.
By securing naval dominance of the South China Sea and adjacent waters, the Obama administration evidently aims to acquire the 21st century energy equivalent of 20th century nuclear blackmail. Push us too far, the policy implies, and we'll bring your economy to its knees by blocking your flow of vital energy supplies.
Of course, nothing like this will ever be said in public, but it is inconceivable that senior administration officials are not thinking along just these lines, and there is ample evidence that the Chinese are deeply worried about the risk - as indicated, for example, by their frantic efforts to build staggeringly expensive pipelines across the entire expanse of Asia to the Caspian Sea basin.
As the underlying nature of the new Obama strategic blueprint becomes clearer, there can be no question that the Chinese leadership will, in response, take steps to ensure the safety of China's energy lifelines. Some of these moves will undoubtedly be economic and diplomatic, including, for example, efforts to court regional players like Vietnam and Indonesia as well as major oil suppliers like Angola, Nigeria and Saudi Arabia. Make no mistake, however: others will be of a military nature.
A significant buildup of the Chinese navy - still small and backward when compared to the fleets of the United States and its principal allies - would seem all but inevitable. Likewise, closer military ties between China and Russia, as well as with the Central Asian member states of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan), are assured.
In addition, Washington could now be sparking the beginnings of a genuine Cold-War-style arms race in Asia, which neither country can, in the long run, afford. All of this is likely to lead to greater tension and a heightened risk of inadvertent escalation arising out of future incidents involving US, Chinese and allied vessels - such as the one that occurred in March 2009 when a flotilla of Chinese naval vessels surrounded a US anti-submarine warfare surveillance ship, the Impeccable, and almost precipitated a shooting incident. As more warships circulate through these waters in an increasingly provocative fashion, the risk that such an incident will result in something far more explosive can only grow.
"Greater reliance on ... the 'dirtiest' of energies will result in increased greenhouse gas emissions and a multitude of other environmental hazards."
Nor will the potential risks and costs of such a military-first policy aimed at China be restricted to Asia. In the drive to promote greater US self-sufficiency in energy output, the Obama administration is giving its approval to production techniques - Arctic drilling, deep-offshore drilling and hydraulic fracturing - that are guaranteed to lead to further Deepwater Horizon-style environmental catastrophe at home.
Greater reliance on Canadian tar sands, the "dirtiest" of energies, will result in increased greenhouse gas emissions and a multitude of other environmental hazards, while deep Atlantic oil production off the Brazilian coast and elsewhere has its own set of grim dangers.
All of this ensures that, environmentally, militarily and economically, we will find ourselves in a more, not less, perilous world. The desire to turn away from disastrous land wars in the Greater Middle East to deal with key issues now simmering in Asia is understandable, but choosing a strategy that puts such an emphasis on military dominance and provocation is bound to provoke a response in kind. It is hardly a prudent path to head down, nor will it, in the long run, advance America's interests at a time when global economic cooperation is crucial. Sacrificing the environment to achieve greater energy independence makes no more sense.
A new Cold War in Asia and a hemispheric energy policy that could endanger the planet: it's a fatal brew that should be reconsidered before the slide toward confrontation and environmental disaster becomes irreversible. You don't have to be a seer to know that this is not the definition of good statesmanship, but of the march of folly.
Al Jazeera 原文
From Al Jazeera
Playing with fire: Obama's threat to China
Michael Klare
Obama says US influence will turn from the Middle East towards the "vast potential of the Asia-Pacific region".
When it comes to China policy, is the Obama administration leaping from the frying pan directly into the fire? In an attempt to turn the page on two disastrous wars in the greater Middle East, it may have just launched a new Cold War in Asia - once again, viewing oil as the key to global supremacy.
The new policy was signalled by President Obama himself on November 17 in an address to the Australian Parliament in which he laid out an audacious - and extremely dangerous - geopolitical vision. Instead of focusing on the greater Middle East, as has been the case for the last decade, the United States will now concentrate its power in Asia and the Pacific.
"My guidance is clear," he declared in Canberra. "As we plan and budget for the future, we will allocate the resources necessary to maintain our strong military presence in this region."
While administration officials insist that this new policy is not aimed specifically at China, the implication is clear enough: from now on, the primary focus of US military strategy will not be counterterrorism, but the containment of that economically booming land - at whatever risk or cost.
The planet's new centre of gravity
The new emphasis on Asia and the containment of China is necessary, top officials insist, because the Asia-Pacific region now constitutes the "centre of gravity" of world economic activity. While the United States was bogged down in Iraq and Afghanistan, the argument goes, China had the leeway to expand its influence in the region.
For the first time since the end of World War II, Washington is no longer the dominant economic actor there. If the United States is to retain its title as the world's paramount power, it must, this thinking goes, restore its primacy in the region and roll back Chinese influence. In the coming decades, no foreign policy task will, it is claimed, be more important than this.
In line with its new strategy, the administration has undertaken a number of moves intended to bolster US power in Asia, and so put China on the defensive. These include a decision to deploy an initial 250 US Marines - someday to be upped to 2,500 - to an Australian air base in Darwin on that country's north coast, and the adoption on November 18 of "the Manila Declaration", a pledge of closer US military ties with the Philippines.
"An economically weakened United States can no longer hope to prevail in multiple regions simultaneously."
At the same time, the White House announced the sale of 24 F-16 fighter jets to Indonesia and a visit by Hillary Clinton to isolated Burma, long a Chinese ally - the first there by a secretary of state in 56 years. Clinton has also spoken of increased diplomatic and military ties with Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam - all countries surrounding China or overlooking key trade routes that China relies on for importing raw materials and exporting manufactured goods.
As portrayed by administration officials, such moves are intended to maximise America's advantages in the diplomatic and military realm at a time when China dominates the economic realm regionally. In a recent article in Foreign Policy magazine, Clinton revealingly suggested that an economically weakened United States can no longer hope to prevail in multiple regions simultaneously. It must choose its battlefields carefully and deploy its limited assets - most of them of a military nature - to maximum advantage. Given Asia's strategic centrality to global power, this means concentrating resources there.
"Over the last ten years," she writes, "we have allocated immense resources to [Iraq and Afghanistan]. In the next ten years, we need to be smart and systematic about where we invest time and energy, so that we put ourselves in the best position to sustain our leadership [and] secure our interests ... One of the most important tasks of American statecraft over the next decade will therefore be to lock in a substantially increased investment - diplomatic, economic, strategic and otherwise - in the Asia-Pacific region."
Such thinking, with its distinctly military focus, appears dangerously provocative. The steps announced entail an increased military presence in waters bordering China and enhanced military ties with that country's neighbours - moves certain to arouse alarm in Beijing and strengthen the hand of those in the ruling circle (especially in the Chinese military leadership) who favour a more activist, militarised response to US incursions.
Whatever forms that takes, one thing is certain: the leadership of the globe's number two economic power is not going to let itself appear weak and indecisive in the face of a US buildup on the periphery of its country. This, in turn, means that we may be sowing the seeds of a new Cold War in Asia in 2011.
The US military buildup and the potential for a powerful Chinese counter-thrust have already been the subject of discussion in the American and Asian press. But one crucial dimension of this incipient struggle has received no attention at all: the degree to which Washington's sudden moves have been dictated by a fresh analysis of the global energy equation, revealing (as the Obama administration sees it) increased vulnerabilities for the Chinese side and new advantages for Washington.
The new energy equation
For decades, the United States has been heavily dependent on imported oil, much of it obtained from the Middle East and Africa, while China was largely self-sufficient in oil output. In 2001, the United States consumed 19.6 million barrels of oil per day, while producing only nine million barrels itself. The dependency on foreign suppliers for that 10.6 million-barrel shortfall proved a source of enormous concern for Washington policymakers. They responded by forging ever closer, more militarised ties with Middle Eastern oil producers and going to war on occasion to ensure the safety of US supply lines.
In 2001, China, on the other hand, consumed only five million barrels per day and so, with a domestic output of 3.3 million barrels, needed to import only 1.7 million barrels. Those cold, hard numbers made its leadership far less concerned about the reliability of the country's major overseas providers - and so it did not need to duplicate the same sort of foreign policy entanglements that Washington had long been involved in.
Now, so the Obama administration has concluded, the tables are beginning to turn. As a result of China's booming economy and the emergence of a sizeable and growing middle class (many of whom have already bought their first cars), the country's oil consumption is exploding. Running at about 7.8 million barrels per day in 2008, it will, according to recent projections by the US Department of Energy, reach 13.6 million barrels in 2020, and 16.9 million in 2035.
Domestic oil production, on the other hand, is expected to grow from 4.0 million barrels per day in 2008 to 5.3 million in 2035. Not surprisingly, then, Chinese imports are expected to skyrocket from 3.8 million barrels per day in 2008 to a projected 11.6 million in 2035 - at which time they will exceed those of the United States.
"Thanks to increased production in 'tough oil' areas of the United States ... future imports are expected to decline, even as energy consumption rises."
The US, meanwhile, can look forward to an improved energy situation. Thanks to increased production in "tough oil" areas of the United States, including the Arctic seas off Alaska, the deep waters of the Gulf of Mexico and shale formations in Montana, North Dakota and Texas, future imports are expected to decline, even as energy consumption rises.
In addition, more oil is likely to be available from the Western Hemisphere rather than the Middle East or Africa. Again, this will be thanks to the exploitation of yet more "tough oil" areas, including the Athabasca tar sands of Canada, Brazilian oil fields in the deep Atlantic and increasingly pacified energy-rich regions of previously war-torn Colombia. According to the Department of Energy, combined production in the United States, Canada and Brazil is expected to climb by 10.6 million barrels per day between 2009 and 2035 - an enormous jump, considering that most areas of the world are expecting declining output.
Whose sea lanes are these anyway?
From a geopolitical perspective, all this seems to confer a genuine advantage on the United States, even as China becomes ever more vulnerable to the vagaries of events in, or along, the sea lanes to distant lands. It means Washington will be able to contemplate a gradual loosening of its military and political ties with the Middle Eastern oil states that have dominated its foreign policy for so long and have led to those costly, devastating wars.
Indeed, as President Obama said in Canberra, the US is now in a position to begin to refocus its military capabilities elsewhere. "After a decade in which we fought two wars that cost us dearly," he declared, "the United States is turning our attention to the vast potential of the Asia-Pacific region."
For China, all this spells potential strategic impairment. Although some of China's imported oil will travel overland through pipelines from Kazakhstan and Russia, the great majority of it will still come by tanker from the Middle East, Africa and Latin America over sea lanes policed by the US Navy. Indeed, almost every tanker bringing oil to China travels across the South China Sea, a body of water the Obama administration is now seeking to place under effective naval control.
By securing naval dominance of the South China Sea and adjacent waters, the Obama administration evidently aims to acquire the 21st century energy equivalent of 20th century nuclear blackmail. Push us too far, the policy implies, and we'll bring your economy to its knees by blocking your flow of vital energy supplies.
Of course, nothing like this will ever be said in public, but it is inconceivable that senior administration officials are not thinking along just these lines, and there is ample evidence that the Chinese are deeply worried about the risk - as indicated, for example, by their frantic efforts to build staggeringly expensive pipelines across the entire expanse of Asia to the Caspian Sea basin.
As the underlying nature of the new Obama strategic blueprint becomes clearer, there can be no question that the Chinese leadership will, in response, take steps to ensure the safety of China's energy lifelines. Some of these moves will undoubtedly be economic and diplomatic, including, for example, efforts to court regional players like Vietnam and Indonesia as well as major oil suppliers like Angola, Nigeria and Saudi Arabia. Make no mistake, however: others will be of a military nature.
A significant buildup of the Chinese navy - still small and backward when compared to the fleets of the United States and its principal allies - would seem all but inevitable. Likewise, closer military ties between China and Russia, as well as with the Central Asian member states of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan), are assured.
In addition, Washington could now be sparking the beginnings of a genuine Cold-War-style arms race in Asia, which neither country can, in the long run, afford. All of this is likely to lead to greater tension and a heightened risk of inadvertent escalation arising out of future incidents involving US, Chinese and allied vessels - such as the one that occurred in March 2009 when a flotilla of Chinese naval vessels surrounded a US anti-submarine warfare surveillance ship, the Impeccable, and almost precipitated a shooting incident. As more warships circulate through these waters in an increasingly provocative fashion, the risk that such an incident will result in something far more explosive can only grow.
"Greater reliance on ... the 'dirtiest' of energies will result in increased greenhouse gas emissions and a multitude of other environmental hazards."
Nor will the potential risks and costs of such a military-first policy aimed at China be restricted to Asia. In the drive to promote greater US self-sufficiency in energy output, the Obama administration is giving its approval to production techniques - Arctic drilling, deep-offshore drilling and hydraulic fracturing - that are guaranteed to lead to further Deepwater Horizon-style environmental catastrophe at home.
Greater reliance on Canadian tar sands, the "dirtiest" of energies, will result in increased greenhouse gas emissions and a multitude of other environmental hazards, while deep Atlantic oil production off the Brazilian coast and elsewhere has its own set of grim dangers.
All of this ensures that, environmentally, militarily and economically, we will find ourselves in a more, not less, perilous world. The desire to turn away from disastrous land wars in the Greater Middle East to deal with key issues now simmering in Asia is understandable, but choosing a strategy that puts such an emphasis on military dominance and provocation is bound to provoke a response in kind. It is hardly a prudent path to head down, nor will it, in the long run, advance America's interests at a time when global economic cooperation is crucial. Sacrificing the environment to achieve greater energy independence makes no more sense.
A new Cold War in Asia and a hemispheric energy policy that could endanger the planet: it's a fatal brew that should be reconsidered before the slide toward confrontation and environmental disaster becomes irreversible. You don't have to be a seer to know that this is not the definition of good statesmanship, but of the march of folly.
Al Jazeera 原文
星期一, 12月 12, 2011
香港政府親商的取態仍舊沒變
香港政府親商的取態仍舊沒變，許多時對對商人不利的資訊都不會公布，市民的利益及對市民重要的知情權反而是次要。
政府許多時不公佈出問題商店的名字、不公佈對市民有害的資訊，我想對於大部份這並不是「平衡」而是徧向商介利益。
奶油包含菌溫牀 食安不公布
熱狗同列高風險 私籲業界「勿放4小時」
【明報專訊】不少港人愛吃的香軟椰絲奶油包和熱狗，其實是高風險含菌麵包，食安中心早前調查已發現此兩款麵包的「微生物質素欠佳」，卻只向業界披露資料，並私下速速擬訂指引，籲業界應將放在室溫逾4小時的椰絲奶油包和熱狗棄掉，不能再賣，惟公眾對此風險全不知情，習慣買椰絲奶油留翌日做早餐的市民恐隨時食到屙。
食安中心最新研究亦顯示，市面食品中，桂花魚、蠔和鯧魚是二噁英含量最高食物，受砒霜污染最嚴重食品則是通菜、鹹蛋和蠔，此兩物質均屬致癌物，但署方亦只選擇性率先向食物業界講解，至今未向公眾發布資料（見另稿）。
早前調查發現 只向業界講解 食物安全中心上周發表，籲業界年底前提交意見，更特別就安全製作椰絲奶油包和熱狗訂立指引，背後原來是調查揭發兩款包含菌問題。據本報了解，食環署顧問醫生何玉賢上周與業界會晤披露，早前檢測麵包微生物含量，發現椰絲奶油包和熱狗均屬「微生物質素欠佳」的高風險麵包。
食安中心沒有進一步透露有關麵包含菌量，以及何時會公布有關資料，不過卻急急發出指引，提醒業界製作椰絲奶油包時應向供應商查詢使用的人造奶油在室溫下存放是否安全，配製奶油餡料時應審慎，以免過量。椰絲奶油包若放室溫超過4小時便應棄掉。
至於製作熱狗，指引亦要求業界要將香腸中心溫度加熱至75℃，維持至少30秒，熱狗須存放室溫少於2小時並放入雪櫃，若存放超過4小時亦要棄掉。
有麵包店擺逾5小時 記者巡視灣仔多間麵包店，大部分店員均指椰絲包出爐後很快售罄，無可能存放逾4小時，但亦有麵包店中午12時出爐的椰絲奶油包，大約十多個仍擺放至下午5時。記者查問店員知否食環署指引，店員卻回應﹕「食環署殺到來才找我老闆吧！」
奶油滋生金黃葡萄球菌
傳染病專科醫生勞永樂直指，奶油是滋長金黃葡萄球菌的溫牀，只要有糖和鹽能量，細菌便可高速滋生，奶油包在室溫存放2小時已不合規格，食安中心指引將之延長至4小時實已對業界很「寬鬆」。他不諱言，「食環署最弊是什麼都說要取平衡」，不公布資料怕業界受損，市民不知風險甚至再用人手揀麵包，反會令麵包含菌問題惡化。
政府許多時不公佈出問題商店的名字、不公佈對市民有害的資訊，我想對於大部份這並不是「平衡」而是徧向商介利益。
奶油包含菌溫牀 食安不公布
熱狗同列高風險 私籲業界「勿放4小時」
【明報專訊】不少港人愛吃的香軟椰絲奶油包和熱狗，其實是高風險含菌麵包，食安中心早前調查已發現此兩款麵包的「微生物質素欠佳」，卻只向業界披露資料，並私下速速擬訂指引，籲業界應將放在室溫逾4小時的椰絲奶油包和熱狗棄掉，不能再賣，惟公眾對此風險全不知情，習慣買椰絲奶油留翌日做早餐的市民恐隨時食到屙。
食安中心最新研究亦顯示，市面食品中，桂花魚、蠔和鯧魚是二噁英含量最高食物，受砒霜污染最嚴重食品則是通菜、鹹蛋和蠔，此兩物質均屬致癌物，但署方亦只選擇性率先向食物業界講解，至今未向公眾發布資料（見另稿）。
早前調查發現 只向業界講解 食物安全中心上周發表，籲業界年底前提交意見，更特別就安全製作椰絲奶油包和熱狗訂立指引，背後原來是調查揭發兩款包含菌問題。據本報了解，食環署顧問醫生何玉賢上周與業界會晤披露，早前檢測麵包微生物含量，發現椰絲奶油包和熱狗均屬「微生物質素欠佳」的高風險麵包。
食安中心沒有進一步透露有關麵包含菌量，以及何時會公布有關資料，不過卻急急發出指引，提醒業界製作椰絲奶油包時應向供應商查詢使用的人造奶油在室溫下存放是否安全，配製奶油餡料時應審慎，以免過量。椰絲奶油包若放室溫超過4小時便應棄掉。
至於製作熱狗，指引亦要求業界要將香腸中心溫度加熱至75℃，維持至少30秒，熱狗須存放室溫少於2小時並放入雪櫃，若存放超過4小時亦要棄掉。
有麵包店擺逾5小時 記者巡視灣仔多間麵包店，大部分店員均指椰絲包出爐後很快售罄，無可能存放逾4小時，但亦有麵包店中午12時出爐的椰絲奶油包，大約十多個仍擺放至下午5時。記者查問店員知否食環署指引，店員卻回應﹕「食環署殺到來才找我老闆吧！」
奶油滋生金黃葡萄球菌
傳染病專科醫生勞永樂直指，奶油是滋長金黃葡萄球菌的溫牀，只要有糖和鹽能量，細菌便可高速滋生，奶油包在室溫存放2小時已不合規格，食安中心指引將之延長至4小時實已對業界很「寬鬆」。他不諱言，「食環署最弊是什麼都說要取平衡」，不公布資料怕業界受損，市民不知風險甚至再用人手揀麵包，反會令麵包含菌問題惡化。
和平奬真是錯發給奧巴馬
奧巴馬上台初期便授予了他和平奬，說是要鼓勵他對和平作出貢獻，可是幾年下來，奧巴馬不但對和平沒有多大建樹，而且還有重啟東西方冷戰的勢態，使世界和平的發展出現更大變數，也更易挑起武器競賽，和平奬真是錯發給奧巴馬。
【明報專訊】 美遏普京保一哥地位東西對峙似冷戰重來
歷史往往充滿嘲諷，20年前的這個月，蘇聯分崩離析，紅旗從克里姆林宮緩緩降下，蘇聯隱入歷史，西方國家稱為一個時代的結束，是新時代的開始；美國等西方國家從此展開與俄羅斯的蜜月期，俄羅斯總統葉利欽成為民主象徵。20年後的今天，美國國務卿認為剛結束的俄羅斯國家杜馬即下議院選舉「不誠實」，換來是志切再當總統的俄羅斯總理普京反擊，認為希拉里的講話煽動俄羅斯國內近期的連串騷亂。
美國和俄羅斯是大國，儘管美國今天經濟一蹶不振，俄羅斯也未及20年前的蘇聯那樣縱橫七海，但仍是舉足輕重的大國。如今不留情面互相攻擊，意味未來一段時間，美俄關係以至全球戰略面貌可能發展至另一階段——一場新冷戰正以人們不熟悉的姿態和強度，重新來到人們頭上。
普京失席位仍強勢
美國挑戰引發反擊
俄羅斯國家杜馬選舉後，普京領導的統一俄羅斯黨得票不過半，只有49.32%，席位238個，比選前的315席大幅減少。選舉後，俄羅斯一些城巿包括首都莫斯科發生反政府示威，普京認為，這是由於美國國務卿希拉里的講話導致國人上街，於是毫不客氣反擊美國。
平情而言，儘管普京的統一俄羅斯黨得票較前為少，但到今天，俄羅斯還未有一個政黨或政治人物可取而代之，成績最接近統一俄羅斯黨的俄共只得19%即92席，况且當地有一些小政黨會與統一俄羅斯黨結盟組成聯合政府，普京地位難以取代。從這條路走下去，普京明年勢必在3月的總統大選重回克里姆林宮，展開政治生命的第二個總統任期。
普京此前在總統任內取得成功，在於他藉能源經濟，把俄羅斯從葉利欽時代的一塌糊塗經濟平地一聲雷搞上去，人民生活大幅改善，加上普京全力把俄羅斯重建為政治及軍事大國，這種文治武功皆回到大國年代的管治，構成普京當了8年總統及4年總理之後，重主克里姆林宮的政治慾望。
普京當總統的年代，美俄關係尚能維持不墜，是因為熱點減少，連中東問題俄羅斯也不多插手；伊朗及朝鮮核危機，美俄立場雖異，但與冷戰年間的針鋒相對完全迥異。不過，這種信任近年有變，美國在歐洲東部的一些動作，例如把俄羅斯毗鄰的東歐國家拉入北約，逐漸令俄羅斯感到這種包圍愈來愈接近。說到底，俄羅斯是一個對自身歷史滿懷驕傲的大國，豈容美國把戰線挖到腳下，可是，就在這時，俄羅斯國家杜馬選舉出現違法行為，而普京的強勢似乎有減退跡象，美國就站出來批評選舉舞弊。
俄羅斯當局把反政府示威視作美國策劃的活動，事實上，雖然不少城巿有類似示威，但總的來說還是不可能扳倒普京。相反，普京會以更強硬手段回應，普京在前蘇聯時代是國家安全委員會官員，也是柔道黑帶高手，如此成長背景和運動鍛煉，不大可能令普京在美國的批評下低頭。
美東西兩線包夾中俄
冷戰圍堵戰略隱然見
美國近年外交政策出現東西方兩條戰線的發展，一是在西太平洋和中國的關係，從南海主權的高調講話為其他國家撐腰，到調動海軍陸戰隊駐紮澳洲，有看法認為，美國通過南海糾紛，組建若隱若現的圍堵中國同盟；同時，美國又通過北約在俄羅斯西線進行包夾。這兩條戰線在20年前蘇聯解體後一度消失，如今以另一種形態出現，值得注意。
美國東西兩線的動作，很有當年冷戰味，同樣是亞洲包圍中國、歐洲頂住俄羅斯，儘管可以爭辯說，這和冷戰年代的核武兵戎相見很不同，但如今看來，除了沒有足以滅地球幾次的戰略核武劍指對手，戰略位置的爭奪基本一樣。這帶出一個問題﹕美國緣何重開兩條戰線？
核心仍是全球政治和經濟的主導權。2008年金融海嘯後，美國國力大挫，中俄則因置身事外避過一劫，尋且因美國國勢下滑而登上領先大國位置。美國當了幾十年老大哥，不欲坐視失去這個位置，這不但牽涉政治地位，更重要的是經濟地位也隨時失守，這是美國千秋萬代的巨大利益。這麼一來，爭霸之心重燃，各式遏制戰略出籠，90年代的溫煦關係進入冷凍期。希拉里敢於在普京失意時刻來這一手，美國很大程度已有準備在普京再擔任總統任期內，美俄關係不會明顯好轉。面對美國咄咄逼人，受到美國包夾的中俄兩國，關係可能再進一步，這與上次冷戰的全球戰略形態，確有幾分相似。
【明報專訊】 美遏普京保一哥地位東西對峙似冷戰重來
歷史往往充滿嘲諷，20年前的這個月，蘇聯分崩離析，紅旗從克里姆林宮緩緩降下，蘇聯隱入歷史，西方國家稱為一個時代的結束，是新時代的開始；美國等西方國家從此展開與俄羅斯的蜜月期，俄羅斯總統葉利欽成為民主象徵。20年後的今天，美國國務卿認為剛結束的俄羅斯國家杜馬即下議院選舉「不誠實」，換來是志切再當總統的俄羅斯總理普京反擊，認為希拉里的講話煽動俄羅斯國內近期的連串騷亂。
美國和俄羅斯是大國，儘管美國今天經濟一蹶不振，俄羅斯也未及20年前的蘇聯那樣縱橫七海，但仍是舉足輕重的大國。如今不留情面互相攻擊，意味未來一段時間，美俄關係以至全球戰略面貌可能發展至另一階段——一場新冷戰正以人們不熟悉的姿態和強度，重新來到人們頭上。
普京失席位仍強勢
美國挑戰引發反擊
俄羅斯國家杜馬選舉後，普京領導的統一俄羅斯黨得票不過半，只有49.32%，席位238個，比選前的315席大幅減少。選舉後，俄羅斯一些城巿包括首都莫斯科發生反政府示威，普京認為，這是由於美國國務卿希拉里的講話導致國人上街，於是毫不客氣反擊美國。
平情而言，儘管普京的統一俄羅斯黨得票較前為少，但到今天，俄羅斯還未有一個政黨或政治人物可取而代之，成績最接近統一俄羅斯黨的俄共只得19%即92席，况且當地有一些小政黨會與統一俄羅斯黨結盟組成聯合政府，普京地位難以取代。從這條路走下去，普京明年勢必在3月的總統大選重回克里姆林宮，展開政治生命的第二個總統任期。
普京此前在總統任內取得成功，在於他藉能源經濟，把俄羅斯從葉利欽時代的一塌糊塗經濟平地一聲雷搞上去，人民生活大幅改善，加上普京全力把俄羅斯重建為政治及軍事大國，這種文治武功皆回到大國年代的管治，構成普京當了8年總統及4年總理之後，重主克里姆林宮的政治慾望。
普京當總統的年代，美俄關係尚能維持不墜，是因為熱點減少，連中東問題俄羅斯也不多插手；伊朗及朝鮮核危機，美俄立場雖異，但與冷戰年間的針鋒相對完全迥異。不過，這種信任近年有變，美國在歐洲東部的一些動作，例如把俄羅斯毗鄰的東歐國家拉入北約，逐漸令俄羅斯感到這種包圍愈來愈接近。說到底，俄羅斯是一個對自身歷史滿懷驕傲的大國，豈容美國把戰線挖到腳下，可是，就在這時，俄羅斯國家杜馬選舉出現違法行為，而普京的強勢似乎有減退跡象，美國就站出來批評選舉舞弊。
俄羅斯當局把反政府示威視作美國策劃的活動，事實上，雖然不少城巿有類似示威，但總的來說還是不可能扳倒普京。相反，普京會以更強硬手段回應，普京在前蘇聯時代是國家安全委員會官員，也是柔道黑帶高手，如此成長背景和運動鍛煉，不大可能令普京在美國的批評下低頭。
美東西兩線包夾中俄
冷戰圍堵戰略隱然見
美國近年外交政策出現東西方兩條戰線的發展，一是在西太平洋和中國的關係，從南海主權的高調講話為其他國家撐腰，到調動海軍陸戰隊駐紮澳洲，有看法認為，美國通過南海糾紛，組建若隱若現的圍堵中國同盟；同時，美國又通過北約在俄羅斯西線進行包夾。這兩條戰線在20年前蘇聯解體後一度消失，如今以另一種形態出現，值得注意。
美國東西兩線的動作，很有當年冷戰味，同樣是亞洲包圍中國、歐洲頂住俄羅斯，儘管可以爭辯說，這和冷戰年代的核武兵戎相見很不同，但如今看來，除了沒有足以滅地球幾次的戰略核武劍指對手，戰略位置的爭奪基本一樣。這帶出一個問題﹕美國緣何重開兩條戰線？
核心仍是全球政治和經濟的主導權。2008年金融海嘯後，美國國力大挫，中俄則因置身事外避過一劫，尋且因美國國勢下滑而登上領先大國位置。美國當了幾十年老大哥，不欲坐視失去這個位置，這不但牽涉政治地位，更重要的是經濟地位也隨時失守，這是美國千秋萬代的巨大利益。這麼一來，爭霸之心重燃，各式遏制戰略出籠，90年代的溫煦關係進入冷凍期。希拉里敢於在普京失意時刻來這一手，美國很大程度已有準備在普京再擔任總統任期內，美俄關係不會明顯好轉。面對美國咄咄逼人，受到美國包夾的中俄兩國，關係可能再進一步，這與上次冷戰的全球戰略形態，確有幾分相似。
星期三, 12月 07, 2011
通識的問號！
曾有機會跟設計通識課的人傾過，他們的計分方法也就是找些現存的資料文獻，在當中找一些"keywords"，然後比分就看文中中了多少"keywords"，這就可以解釋為何幾份抄考而成的報告竟都取得了高分，因為設計通識課的人也不是強調邏輯思考而是抄考。
也有跟個做學生的談了一吓，他們就是知道是計"keywords"，不中"keyword"沒分，對這樣的計分方法也無可奈何。
也有跟個做學生的談了一吓，他們就是知道是計"keywords"，不中"keyword"沒分，對這樣的計分方法也無可奈何。
"吹脹80後 - 張潤衡
通識的問號！
(2011年12月07日)
通識的問號！
(2011年12月07日)
其實老師不懂「研究」是很合理的。因為在大學的教育裡，若主修科跟研究無關的話，除非你同時進修了研究碩士或博士課程，不然，你一生都未必有機會接觸到研究這東西。
研究是一門十分專業的知識，在研究的世界裡最講究的是正確研究方法，準確的研究結果，與及誠實的研究態度。
這三項條件，從我的幾位晚輩的研究報告當中，我連一項也見不到，當然，在他們的老師身上也見不到任何其中一項。
結果怎樣了？
他們隨便的找來幾份資料，隨便的寫幾條問題當成問卷，然後便隨便的自問自答地完成眼前的幾十份試卷，再隨便找來一些文獻東抄考，西抄考的抄成一份報告。
我好言相勸幾位晚輩說，在大學被發現抄襲他人的研究可會被立即踢出校的。答覆卻竟然是：「等考上大學才算吧！」
我本想，沒法子吧，讓她們被中學老師處罰總好過他們日被大學踢出校。可是，這幾份抄考而成的報告竟都取得了高分而回！
我心想，抄得這麼明顯也沒被發現，我還能信通識嗎？"
星期二, 11月 29, 2011
美國為何要逼人民幣升值
除了逼人民幣升值，這幾年美國的外交活動都不時以反華作主題或離間第三國與中國的關係，希拉里就曾在柬埔寨的對大學生的演講中叫柬埔寨不要太親近中國，也在出訪非洲時不點名批評中國是非洲的新植民主意者。
美國現在是有心阻撓中國的和平發展，他甚至有可能會為自己的利益挑起中國與其他國家的戰爭...
C觀點 - 施永青
(2011年11月29日)
(2011年11月29日)
這是世上最荒謬的指控，完全不合情理。中美貿易是雙方在你情我願的情況下進行的，如果美國覺得這樣做對美國沒有好處，隨時可以不再幫襯中國。中國並沒有用軍事力量去逼外國非買中國貨不可。
現實是美國的消費者覺得中國貨抵買，才會選擇中國貨的。世上的買家，只會怨貨品的售價貴，哪有怨貨品的訂價低的。美國想中國貨覺得貴一些，很明顯是一種政治上的考慮，而不是純為了經濟利益。
中國能把產品以一個低廉的價格出售，是要付出代價的。為此，中國人付出了血汗，中國的河山受到嚴重的污染，若非中國的經濟底子差，在自己的人民消費能力有限的時候，不得不依賴出口去帶動經濟。有條件的話，中國怎會不想把自己產品售價訂得高一點？
現實是在每一單貿易談判中，中國的廠家都在試圖賣到好一點的價錢，壓價的是美國的入口商；現在美國卻反過來惡人先告狀。美國為何不設法令自己的入口商出價高一點，中國作為賣方，一定不會反對。
自從中國產品大量輸美後，美國的通脹一直處於偏低水平，而美國人的物質生活亦相對比以前更豐裕，那美國為甚麼還要不斷指控中國呢？原因是美國作為世界的一哥，他最不想看到有另一個國家可崛起，逐漸威脅他的地位。誰想做老二，美國就不讓他好過，非要他自覺地與老大保持一段距離不可。鄧小平就是看到了這一點，才告誡中國應韜光養晦的。
鄧小平原先是叫中國不要當頭的，但中國後來卻想有多點作為，又辦奧運，又辦世博，只以新發彩的氣勢去四處旅遊，買名牌，掃紅酒，自招妒忌。
美國指中國產品的傾銷打擊了美國本土的製造業，這只是一種藉口吧了。美國自八十年代開始，已進行產業轉型，不再依賴低增值的製造業，改為發展高增值的服務業。沒有中國貨的競爭，美國一樣敵不過日本、南韓、印尼，以至墨西哥的競爭。
由此可見，美國要人民幣升值，根本不是為了挽救自己的製造業，而是要拖累中國對全球的出口貿易。人民幣的匯價一旦按美國的標準大幅上升，中國的產品就會一下子變得不便宜，那中國過去那種依賴出口作經濟推動的發展模式，就必然會受阻滯。如果中國一時找不到新的發展模式，變成走日本的老路，那中國的崛起就不能對美國造成威脅。
星期一, 11月 07, 2011
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